LANGUAGE: ENGLISH

Introduction: The Treaty of Lausanne and establishment of the Republic of Armenia

 

Gertrude Bell, a highly influential figure of the British imperial policymaking in the Middle East wrote to her father, Sir Hugh Bell, on 9th of May 1920, among other things:

"Private and Confidential. We have had an excellent memorandum from the W.O. forwarded to us for information. The W.O. points out the extreme folly of the Turkish peace provisions. As it rightly says: who is going to establish the Armenians in the Turkish territory which is to be allotted to them? Istanbul (Constantinople) is quite powerless to carry out any decrees, if even it accepts the terms, a very large if" [1]

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Shortly after Bell’s letter, the Treaty of Lausanne was signed in 1923, which defined the new realities of the post-war world. After the Lausanne Conference, the Democratic Republic of Armenia was founded in eastern Turkey, where there was no significant Armenian population. Later, Armenia was invaded by the Red Army and became a part of the Soviet Union.

Since the Lausanne Conference, Turkey experienced various crises: social, economic and political, which were reflected in a number of military coups. A failed military coup attempt in 2016 is often seen as the most influential. According to a number of experts, the coup attempt allowed the Turkish ruling party to spread its wings over imaginary horizons.

The recent escalation of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, which began in the 1980s between Armenia and Azerbaijan provided Turkey with yet more opportunities to establish its global influence. The Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous region was established within Azerbaijan’s territory by the Bolshevik Party in the 1920s.[2] The region was ethnically dominated by the Armenian population and in 1988 the resolution was passed for the region to become a part of Armenia.[3]  The resolution caused an escalation of tensions between Yerevan and Baku, but in 1994 the ceasefire was signed. In autumn 2020, the military operations resumed with the intervention of foreign powers such as Russia and Turkey.

Researchers in Asia Minor are concerned about many questions. Is Turkey currently able, due to its geostrategic status, to enter the big club of central world powers? Can Ankara take part in the strategic competition between theUnited States and China in the maritime environment and the expansion of exclusive economic zones? Will Turkey be able to enter the Silk Road as an emerging trading empire?

These and other questions will lead us to an understanding of the reasons behind the Turkish intervention in the war on Azerbaijan’s side. Support from Ankara ensured Baku’s victory in the conflict and Armenia largely yielded to the conditions of the victor. The agreement, signed by Yerevan, Moscow and Baku, provided Azerbaijan with a land corridor that will connect it with Nakhchivan for the first time in almost a century.

 

A corridor through Nakhchivan

 

Clause 9 of the latest Nagorno-Karabakh ceasefire agreement stipulates: "the need to remove obstacles to transport and economic ties to allow the creation of transport and communication network between Nakhchivan and Azerbaijan."[4] The clause opens up an opportunity for Turkey to start building roads and transport links between its territories and Nakhchivan, which provides Ankara with a direct corridor to Azerbaijan.

With the opening of the aforementioned corridor between Azerbaijan and Nakhchivan, a strategic historical connection will be established. The corridor directly links Turkey with Azerbaijan, as well as provides Ankara with aconnection to the "countries of the Turkic world" in Central Asia.

The emergence of the direct corridor between Baku and Istanbul means that the connection of the formerly closed Caspian basin with the Mediterranean Sea provided Turkey with access to the rest of the continents of the world. This creates a possibility of cargo transit between the seaports of Turkmenbashi (Turkmenistan), Atyrau (Kazakhstan) and Baku (Azerbaijan) to the numerous Turkish seaports in the Black and Marmara seas.

Turkey believes that this corridor assumes the opening of a new era on the geopolitical and economic levelsbetween Ankara and the ancient republics of Central Asia. The new era will open up immense commercial and energy opportunities for Turkish political and military influence in the region.

 

Ankara does not hesitate to announce its readiness to take advantage of this historic opportunity. The TurkishMinistry of Transport and Infrastructure has already begun planning the construction of a railway line to Nakhchivan, which would directly connect Baku with Istanbul.[5]

 

Ankara’s energy ambitions in Central Asia

 

Ankara hopes that the recent geopolitical changes will open the doors to major projects linking Asia with Europe and strengthening Turkey's status as a global energy corridor. In order to achieve this status, Ankara is currently pursuing the resumption of the Trans-Caspian gas pipeline project. The project is a proposed underwater pipeline that would transport gas from Turkmenistan to Azerbaijan and Turkey. The construction of the pipeline was frozen in 2017 due to pressure from Russia and Iran. The new Nakhchivan corridor will allow for the expansion of the pipeline and enable Turkey to transit through other countries.

In accordance with the latest changes, the transportation of gas from Turkmenistan to Turkey and Europe becomes more feasible. The gas pipeline from Turkmenistan passes through the Caspian Sea to Azerbaijan, and from there it will be transported to Turkey through either the existing links (Azerbaijan-Georgia-Turkey) or NakhchivanRepublic. Ankara will then effectively serve as an energy corridor that will transport gas to Europe.

This new reality allows Turkey to challenge major players such as Russia and Iran, who in recent years have beendisrupting the project under the pretext of expected environmental damage.[6] The experts agree that Moscow and Tehran fear that the new pipeline will become an alternative to Russian and Iranian gas for the Turkish and European markets. At present, Russia dominates the European energy market, however, the construction of the pipeline can undermine Moscow’s position as a primary energy supplier.

According to Turkey's estimates, if new direct lines are built to transport gas between Turkey and Azerbaijan through Nakhchivan, Ankara will receive cheaper gas, which will gradually become an alternative to that supplied by Iran. Turkey is currently paying $490 for every thousand cubic meters of Iranian gas, although this cost could be reduced to $335 by 2026 when the gas supply agreement signed between Turkey and Iran expires.[7] Consequently, control over Nakhchivan by Azerbaijan can lead to regional as well as global changes in the energy market. This can further advance the role of Turkey on the international arena extending its influence beyond its borders.

On the 10th of December, 2020, President Erdogan visited Baku to attend the ceremony celebrating Azerbaijan'svictory in the Karabakh war, where he was welcomed with royal honors.[8] Tens of thousands of people greeted his convoy on the main streets of the capital of Azerbaijan, waving Turkish flags. Erdogan’s support of Azerbaijan and the role of Turkey in the negotiations of the Karabakh peace agreement further cemented Turkish influence in the Caucasus.

 

The influence of other central powers in the region

 

Despite Turkey’s success, we cannot ignore the fact of the Russian military presence in the conflict zone to ensurethe implementation of the ceasefire agreement between Baku and Yerevan. In accordance with the latest peace agreement, at least 2,000 Russian soldiers will be present in the Nagorno-Karabakh region to ensure the implementation and enforcement of the ceasefire agreement.[9] Consequently, Moscow managed to turn the situation in its favor and prevent a Turkish presence in the region after the end of the war. Did the Kremlin manage to overthrow Ankara? Will the Russians allow Turkey to achieve their economic and strategic dreams in the Caucasus?

Russian involvement in the conflict further exemplifies the rivalry between Moscow and Ankara. The pages of history are rife with military confrontations between Russians and Turks, and under other circumstances, it is possible that the current diplomatic maneuvers between the two sides can be seen as a cautious, fragile and temporary phenomenon.

We must not lose sight of the strategies of other world powers that directly or indirectly interfere in the affairs of the countries of Central Asia. The most important of them, besides Russia, are the United States, China and Japan. Out of these states, China has arguably been the most influential in Central Asia. Beijing exercises both economic and diplomatic mechanisms to influence the Central Asian Republics. In 2018 alone, China invested approximately $14.7 billion in the Central Asian states.[10] The foundation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) in 2001 provided China with more diplomatic capabilities to influence the Central Asian region.[11] Given the geopolitical status of the Central Asian counties and their energy resources, states are actively introducing various initiatives to expand their influence in the region. In addition, the strategies of regional forces are strongly influenced by the international competition amongst these states. Strong ties with the Central Asian region can provide a state with capacities to advance its position on the international arena. To that end, Azerbaijan’s victory in Karabakh provides Turkey with leverage to establish a better position in Central Asia.

However, Turkey also employs other economic and diplomatic instruments to expand its influence in CentralAsia. For instance, Ankara is attempting to strengthen its position in the region by extending its links with the Turkiccountries such as Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. To solidify such links, Turkey introduced “Asia Anew”initiative in 2019, which aims at improving Ankara’s relations with the Central Asian countries in a number of sectors suchas trade, academia and culture.[12]

At the national and even social level, Turkey will be able to strengthen its historical ties with the Turkic world bypromoting tourism and direct transport connections. The railway between Turkey and Azerbaijan could further enhance tourist and transport activities between Turkey and Central Asia. The Turkish projects will eventually bring the retention and strengthen the connection of the citizens of Central Asia of Turkic origin with their ancestral homeland, causing significant strategic and political shifts in the long term.

A new roadmap and deeper cooperation in the military and defense industry are outlined in the Turkic Vision2040 plan and the Turkic Council's 2020-2025 strategy.[13] However, let us not forget that Turkey is a member of theNATO Alliance, and Turkish cooperation with Russia in the Nagorno-Karabakh negotiations can jeopardise Turkey’s position in the Alliance. 

 

Conclusion: will Turkey’s dreams come true?

 

From a trade point of view, Turkey strives towards the establishment of an open corridor between Azerbaijan and Nakhchivan. This will allow Turkey to extend its trade relations with Central Asia, China and India. The population of the aforementioned states is equivalent to 3 billion people which makes up almost half of the world’s population. Permanent access to such markets can provide Ankara with an unprecedented economic advantage.
 

Besides the opening of the Asian markets for Turkish consumer goods and facilitation of access to them through the new corridor, Turkey is also aiming to advance its global geostrategic position. Ankara seeks to become a central power by strengthening the Chinese Silk Road in Turkey as well as its trade routes, which we discussed earlier. In recent years, Turkey has implemented a series of projects aimed at the advancement of transport links as a part of the "Eurasia and Sea of Marmara" initiative, connecting Asia and Europe below the Bosporus. Consequently, Ankara’s end goal is to become a bridge that will connect Asia and Europe across different spheres such as energy and trade.

 

In conclusion, the fulfillment of Turkish dreams depends on the dramatics and sophistication on the stage of the opera of the instrumental pragmatism. Ankara has to deal with different scenarios in different regions, so Turkish dancingand maneuvers may sometimes upset the courts. Athena and Zeus are the gods of neighboring Greek mythology of the West, and there is no guarantee that they will not appear with yet another newborn Athena in the head of some Zeus. The issues in Bosporus and Dardanelles are an enslaved opera that could fail due to the Kurdish problem, Syrian crisis anddevaluation of the Turkish Lira. Moreover, the hugs of the Russian bear in Asia Minor are aimed to separate Turkey from NATO despite the arms deals, and it is possible that the growling bear from the folk songs will wake up one day hungry from a coma. 

 

 

 

[1] Gertrude Bell Archive, Newcastle University, United Kingdom.

[2] Cavanaugh, Carey. Report. Council on Foreign Relations, 2017. Accessed December 14, 2020. http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep05705, pp.1-2.

[3] Ibid.

[4] “Statement by the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, the Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia and the President of the Russian Federation,” November 10, 2020, https://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/4419267.

 

[5] Karimli I., “Turkey Plans to Build Railway to Azerbaijan's Nakhchivan Exclave,” November 13, 2020, https://caspiannews.com/news-detail/turkey-plans-to-build-railway-to-azerbaijans-nakhchivan-exclave-2020-11-13- 51/.

[6] Fabio I., “Settling the Caspian Issue and Realizing the Trans-Caspian Energy Corridor” The Diplomat, July 10, 2018, https://thediplomat.com/2018/07/settling-the-caspian-issue-and-realizing-the-trans-caspian-energy-corridor/.

[7] “Iran, Turkey to Discuss Renewing Gas Export Deal in near Future,” Tehran Times, November 9, 2020, https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/454437/Iran-Turkey-to-discuss-renewing-gas-export-deal-in-near-future.

[8] France 24, “'One Nation, Two States' on Display as Erdogan Visits Azerbaijan for Karabakh Victory Parade,” December 10, 2020, https://www.france24.com/en/asia-pacific/20201210-one-nation-two-states-on-display-as- erdogan-visits-azerbaijan-for-karabakh-victory-parade.

[9] “Nagorno-Karabakh: Russia Deploys Peacekeeping Troops to Region,” BBC News (BBC, November 10, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-54885906.

[10] Umarov T., “China Looms Large in Central Asia,” March 30, 2020, https://carnegie.ru/commentary/81402#:~:text=According%20to%20data%20from%20the,Chinese%20investment% 20in%20Asian%20countries).

[11] “The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation” accessed December 10, 2020,  http://eng.sectsco.org/about_sco/.

[12] Ümit Alperen and Eyüp Ersoy , “Turkey and Asia Anew: A Foreign Policy Initiative in Passing ,” October 18, 2019, https://thediplomat.com/2019/10/turkey-and-asia-anew-a-foreign-policy-initiative-in-passing/.

[13] “Nursultan Nazarbayev: Unity of the Turkic World,” accessed December 

11, 2020 https://presidentlibrary.kz/en/news/nursultan-nazarbayev-unity-turkic-world.